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Abstract 
Due to a precise definition of comparative advantage and a deeper understanding of the 
logical interrelationships between this proposition and the two other main elements in David 
Ricardo’s famous numerical example in the Principles – the classical rule of specialization and the 
proposition regarding the non-appliance of the labor theory of value in international exchanges –, 
it is possible to fully appreciate the crucial omissions and shortcomings in Robert Torrens’ 
competing statement in his Essay on the External Corn Trade (1815). In Torrens’ example of 
English cloth being traded for Polish corn, he clearly missed to apply the classical rule of 
specialization for Poland. For this international exchange to take place, though, there has to be 
gains from trade for both trading partners. More importantly, Torrens also failed to recognize 
the crucial role of Ricardo’s insight regarding the non-appliance of the law of value in 
international exchanges in proving the comparative-advantage proposition. Therefore, he is not 
entitled to the same amount of merit as Ricardo since he fell short of formulating a full proof of 
the comparative-advantage proposition prior to the publication of the Principles. 
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Introduction 
 In science the credit goes to the man who convinces the world,  
 not to the man to whom the idea first occurs. 
Francis Darwin 
Since the first half of the nineteenth century until the present there has been an ongoing 
debate among economists about the accurate attribution of authorship-merits for the 
comparative-advantage proposition. Resuming the many twists and turns of this long-standing 
controversy, Roy J. Ruffin (2002, pp. 727-728) critically asserts: 
“Historians of the law of comparative advantage have turned a relatively simple and 
beautiful story into a confused tangle of claims of priority, error, incompleteness, and 
attribution. It has been said that Robert Torrens (1780-1864) deserves the credit for 
discovering the law; James Mill (1773-1836) gave the theory to Ricardo; Ricardo had no 
interest in the law after it appeared; and Ricardo's exposition is deeply incomplete.” 
Although the majority of scholars have traditionally sided with David Ricardo, some 
prestigious scholars have favored Robert Torrens, based on the claim that his Essay on the 
External Corn Trade (1815) was published two years before Ricardo’s Principles and already 
contained a satisfactory enunciation of the comparative-advantage proposition.1 It turned out 
recently, though, that with the notable exemptions of Sraffa (1930) and Ruffin (2002) – both 
Ricardo-supporters –, the rest of the participants in this longstanding academic dispute had 
either an incomplete or flatly wrong understanding of the famous numerical proof of the 
comparative-advantage proposition in chapter seven of the Principles. Given this fact, it is now 
perfectly understandable why there has been such a hassle in identifying the rightful author of 
this proposition. 
Ruffin (2002; 2005) has been lately the most outspoken scholar against granting Torrens 
priority over Ricardo for the formulation of the comparative-advantage proposition. His 2002 
paper indeed represents a significant turning point in the longstanding authorship-debate over 
comparative advantage. In addition to the accurate interpretation of Ricardo’s numbers as 
number of men working for a year required to produce some unspecified amounts of wine and cloth 
traded between England and Portugal, the paper also offers some valuable insights about the 
concrete circumstances and probable date of Ricardo’s formulation of the proposition. 
Moreover, it also contains Ruffin’s first attempt of rejecting Torrens’ claim of authorship by 
                                                
1 See, for example, Seligman (1903, p. 344), Chipman (1965, p. 482), and Samuel Hollander (1979, p. 461). 
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referring to the incomplete nature of the comparative advantage statement in the 1815 pamphlet 
(Ruffin, 2002, pp. 731-735). 
Ruffin’s valuable insights persuaded some well-known scholars like Douglas Irwin and 
Andrea Maneschi to join the ranks of the Ricardo-supporters. Both Irwin (1998) and Maneschi 
(1998) had previously discussed without disputing Chipman’s assessment (1965, p. 482) that the 
credit for the principal discovery should go to Torrens, but later withdrew their tacit support of 
Torrens in a personal communication to Ruffin. 
Notwithstanding these notable conversions, the authorship-debate over comparative 
advantage is far from over. On the contrary, it seems to be headed again in the wrong direction. 
John Aldrich (2004, pp. 379-380), for example, believes that there is much common ground 
between Ruffin (2002) and his own opposing conclusions on the subject, which are the 
following: 
“Torrens, Ricardo and the Mills all made contributions to the discovery of comparative 
advantage, not by a major multiple discovery but through a sequence of insights and 
arguments. Ricardo developed Torrens’s insight, that a country may import corn that is 
more costly to produce abroad, in the direction of a general demonstration that the law of 
value for domestic transactions does not hold for international ones. From the 
demonstration James Mill extracted the principle of comparative advantage and gave it ‘‘due 
emphasis.’’ Torrens had not formulated, nor even grasped the principle, while Ricardo had 
not appreciated there was a principle worth developing. It was from Mill’s Elements, and 
the works that followed, that other economists learned the principle. However Mill’s clear 
and emphatic statement of the principle was supported by unsound arguments. These were 
repaired by his son in an essay published only in 1844. This provided at last an ‘‘appropriate 
setting’’ for the doctrine, as well as convincing support for Ricardo’s original value claim.” 
Aldrich claims that Ricardo and Torrens were not the only ones who contributed to the 
discovery of comparative advantage, but also James and John Stuart Mill. He further asserts that 
Ricardo did not appreciate that there was a principle worth developing. Moreover, Kemp and 
Osaka (2006) suggest in a footnote that Ricardo took the comparative-advantage insight from 
Torrens, calling it the Torrens-Ricardo Principle of Comparative Advantage. Ruffin (2005), on the other 
hand, advances in a second paper on the subject a new and questionable strategy for rejecting 
Torrens’ claim by affirming that the later was the author and main advocate of the so-called 
absolute cost advantage theory of trade. According to Ruffin, this automatically disqualifies any 
claim that Torrens might have, since one can hardly pretend to be the author of two mutually 
exclusive propositions at the same time. 
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There are two main reasons for the persistency of the authorship-debate over comparative 
advantage: first, scholars have different notions about comparative advantage; and second, some 
of them continue to believe that Torrens’s 1815 statement, although not perfect, seems to be 
good enough for granting him part or even the bulk of the merit over Ricardo. Both issues will 
be addressed in the present paper. Its merit over previous efforts consists in highlighting the 
logical interrelationships between the comparative-advantage proposition and the other two key 
elements in Ricardo famous numerical proof: the non-appliance of the labor theory of value in 
international transactions and the classical rule of specialization. Furthermore, the paper also 
offers a definition of comparative-advantage that seems to be the closest to Ricardo’s original 
understanding of it. These findings shed a brighter light on the crucial shortcomings and 
omissions in Torrens’ 1815 statement, and further emphasize Ricardo’s great accomplishment so 
that it can be appreciated to its full extent. 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section presents some definitions of comparative 
advantage used by other scholars in the authorship-debate. The second section offers a 
definition of comparative advantage which I consider to be the closest to Ricardo’s original 
statement in the Principles, followed by an analysis of the crucial logical interrelationships between 
this proposition and the two other important elements mentioned above. The third section 
specifies the achievement with regard to comparative advantage. This is a necessary step prior to 
the examination of Torrens’ 1815 statement in the next section. Finally, the last section before 
the conclusions critically reviews Ruffin’s claim that Torrens was the author of the absolute cost 
advantage theory of trade. While agreeing with Ruffin’s main conclusion that Ricardo deserves 
the merit for the demonstration of the comparative-advantage proposition, the present paper 
argues that Torrens’ presumed advocacy of the absolute advantage theory of trade – even if it 
turns out to be true – is rather irrelevant for judging his merits with respect to the disputed 
proposition. 
The Elusive Concept of Comparative Advantage 
As already mentioned, one of reasons for the continued disagreement among scholars about 
who should be credited for comparative advantage is the fact that there are different notions and 
definitions of the concept in the literature. This diversity of definitions and notions of 
comparative advantage is indeed a major obstacle for resolving the longstanding dispute, since 
any accurate and fair attribution of merit for the formulation of a new concept, proposition or 
theory requires a precise delimitation of the subject for which somebody should be credited. 
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Without this precise specification and understanding of the achievement, any distribution of 
merit ultimately becomes an arbitrary and questionable exercise. It is therefore mandatory to 
start off with a clear definition of comparative advantage. 
If one consults the most recent papers on the authorship-debate – Ruffin (2002, 2005) and 
Aldrich (2004) – in search for a suitable definition of comparative advantage, it becomes 
immediately clear that the task is more complicated than originally thought. Aldrich (2004, p. 
380), for example, interprets the “doctrine of comparative costs” or “principle of comparative 
advantage” as a general principle on the lines of this from Viner (1937, p. 438): “(…) if trade is 
left free each country in the long run tends to specialize in the production of and to export those 
commodities in whose production it enjoys a comparative advantage in terms of real costs, and 
to obtain by importation those commodities which could be produced at home only at a 
comparative disadvantage in terms of real costs, and that such specialization is to the mutual 
advantage of the countries participating in it.” 
There is nothing wrong with Viner’s statement. It just isn’t very helpful for the purpose of 
defining the concept of comparative advantage. What does it actually mean to enjoy a 
comparative advantage in terms of real costs? As my teachers in secondary school reminded me 
on several occasions, one cannot properly define a concept by recurring to the very same 
concept. 
Ruffin (2002, pp. 729-730), on the other hand, defines what he calls the “law” of comparative 
advantage by two inequalities. This definition, though, is based on the neoclassical statement of 
comparative advantage, not Ricardo’s. The neoclassical statement of comparative advantage can 
be found in nearly every contemporary economic textbook under the label Ricardian model. As 
Ruffin (2002), Maneschi (2004, 2008) and Pullen (2006) have explicitly recognized, though, 
Ricardo’s demonstration of comparative advantage in the Principles is very different from the 
textbook version. To this correct assessment I would add that it is not suitable then to try to 
understand and appreciate what Ricardo wrote by starting with the neoclassical statement of 
comparative advantage, as Ruffin does. Such a methodology adds an unnecessary layer of 
complexity to the task. In my opinion, it is much simpler to define Ricardo’s insight by what he 
actually wrote in the Principles, as the following section will show. 
Ricardo’s Understanding and Use of Comparative Advantage 
Ricardo offers in chapter seven of the Principles a simple numerical proof for the proposition 
that “the same rule which regulates the relative value of commodities in one country, does not 
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regulate the relative value of the commodities exchanged between two or more countries (Vol. 1, 
p. 133).”2 This means of course that his labor theory of value is not valid for international 
transactions. 
After offering a full proof of this proposition in the famous numerical example, he makes the 
following observation: “This exchange might even take place, notwithstanding that the 
commodity imported by Portugal could be produced there with less labour than in England. 
Though she could make the cloth with the labour of 90 men, she would import it from a country 
where it required the labour of 100 men to produce it, because it would be advantageous to her 
rather to employ her capital in the production of wine, for which she would obtain more cloth 
from England, than she could produce by diverting a portion of her capital from the cultivation 
of vines to the manufacture of cloth (Vol. 1, p. 135).” This observation contains the essence of 
what later has been known as comparative advantage. According to Ricardo, thus, comparative 
advantage is the proposition that a country might import a certain amount of a commodity 
although it could produce the same amount internally at lower real costs than the exporting 
country. 
The widespread misunderstanding of the original demonstration of comparative advantage in 
the Principles has lead to numerous interpretations regarding the nature and role of this 
proposition in Ricardo’s international trade theory as well as the free trade theory in general. As a 
result, one can find in the economic literature different classifications for comparative advantage 
such as principle, rule, doctrine, theory or law. If one follows closely what is actually written in 
the Principles, though, there is little doubt that Ricardo presented the comparative-advantage 
proposition as a corollary3 of the non-appliance of the labor theory of value in international 
transactions, and not as a general principle or economic law that determines the specialization of 
individuals and countries or the location of industries, like the neoclassical trade theory 
proclaims. As I have demonstrated in a previous paper (Morales Meoqui, 2011, pp. 754-755), this 
classification as corollary derives from the fact that Ricardo could not have proven the 
comparative-advantage proposition if the amounts of cloth and wine traded had to be produced 
with the same amount of labor, as is mandatory under the labor theory of value. 
                                                
2 Throughout this paper, all direct quotations of Ricardo are extracted from The Works and Correspondence of 
David Ricardo, Volume I to XI, 2004, edited by Piero Sraffa. I will refer to them usually by indicating the 
volume and page numbers only. 
3 The Oxford Dictionary defines the term corollary as a proposition that follows from (and is often 
appended to) one already proved, which is exactly how Ricardo presented the comparative-advantage 
proposition in the Principles.  
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The importance of the comparative-advantage proposition for the free-trade case consists in 
the fact that it demonstrates that a country does not need to have a productivity advantage over 
another in order to trade under mutually beneficial terms. It extends thus the occasions in which 
international trade is considered to be mutually beneficial by including the most unfavorable 
setting that one can possibly conceive: the occasion where a country is less productive than 
another in the production of every commodity and does not have the exclusive capacity to 
produce any commodity. 
Because the comparative-advantage proposition proves that free trade is mutually beneficial 
even under the most inconvenient setting, it has been often viewed and presented as the ultimate 
case for free trade. Notwithstanding the fact that it might be possible to build a persuasive case 
for free trade predominantly or even exclusively on the comparative-advantage proposition, I 
would not recommend it. It will most likely fail to convince the public, particularly if one uses 
for this purpose the textbook trade model of comparative advantage, as has been the common 
practice during the last decades. The textbook trade model, unlike Ricardo’s original 
demonstration, makes all kind of unrealistic assumptions like constant returns to scale and 
perfect competition. 
In this respect it is interesting to acknowledge that Ricardo did not rely on the comparative-
advantage proposition as the main argument for free trade. He declares his unconditional 
support for free trade in the Principles before even introducing his new proposition when he 
writes the following: “Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes 
its capital and labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each. This pursuit of 
individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the whole. By stimulating 
industry, by rewarding ingenuity, and by using most efficaciously the peculiar powers bestowed 
by nature, it distributes labour most effectively and most economically: while, by increasing the 
general mass of productions, it diffuses general benefit, and binds together by one common tie 
of interest and intercourse, the universal society of nations throughout the civilized world. It is 
this principle which determines that wine shall be made in France and Portugal, that corn shall 
be grown in America and Poland, and that hardware and other goods shall be manufactured in 
England (2004, Vol. 1, pp. 133–134).” 
Ricardo’s scarce use of the comparative-advantage proposition prompted some scholars to 
wrongly claim that he did not fully understand the value of it because he had taken the insight 
from somebody else (Thweatt, 1976; Rothbard, 1995; Aldrich, 2004). Thweatt in particular 
claimed that Ricardo took the insight from his close friend and collaborator James Mill. As 
Ruffin (2002, p. 735) already pointed out, this claim is rather easy to refute, since Mill wrote to 
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Ricardo after reviewing the manuscript: “The inquiry concerning foreign trade (...) is like the rest, 
original, and sound, and excellently demonstrated. That foreign trade augments not the value of 
a nations property: that it may be good for a country to import commodities from a country where the 
production of those same commodities costs more, than it would cost at home: that a change in manufacturing 
skill in one country, produces a new distribution of the precious metals, are new propositions of the 
highest importance, and which you fully prove” (Ricardo, Vol. VII, p. 99; emphasis added). 
As the letter shows, James Mill immediately grasped the importance of the new proposition 
and was very pleased with the demonstration in the Principles. Moreover, it is quite revealing to 
pay attention to the way in which Mill presented the comparative-advantage proposition in the 
Elements. It is included there in a section entitled “Occasions on which it is the Interest of Nations to 
exchange Commodities with one another” (1826, pp. 118-125). First Mill mentions rather obvious cases 
like the ones in which a country has the exclusive capacity to produce a certain commodity, or 
can produce it much more cheaply than others because it has an abundance of one or more 
factors of production necessary for its production. Then he refers to the case in which a country 
has superior facilities (= the power of producing the same effect with less labor) in both 
commodities with respect to another country. Thus, Mill regards Ricardo’s new proposition as 
an extension of the occasions in which international trade is considered to be mutually beneficial, 
as has been stated before. There is evidently no need to use the proposition in the other 
occasions. 
Furthermore, the comparative-advantage proposition is notably absent from the most 
important trade-policy debate in England between the years 1815 and 1846: the repeal of the 
Corn Laws.4 Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2006) does not even bother to mention the proposition 
in her detailed book on the repeal of the Corn Laws. Although the leading economists of the 
time argued in favor of the repeal, they did not invoke the comparative-advantage proposition to 
fundament their position. They preferred to make their case for free trade more in the lines of 
the Wealth of Nations, as Ricardo himself did in the Principles. 
Perhaps the key reason why the comparative-advantage proposition wasn’t used as the main 
explanation of the virtues of free trade back then is the fact that this proposition is built upon 
and logically intertwined with other important insights of the classical theory of international 
trade, first and foremost with the classical rule of specialization. This rule stipulates that it is 
beneficial for a country to import commodities whenever it can obtain them in exchange for 
exports whose production entails less real cost compared to the home-production of the same 
                                                
4 I’m indebted to Farhad Rassekh for drawing my attention to this important point. 
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amount of the imported commodities. This rule can also be reformulated in order to highlight 
the gains in output instead of input-savings. In that case the classical rule of specialization would 
stipulate that it is beneficial for a country to import commodities whenever it can obtain them in 
greater quantities at the same expense of labor and capital by exporting some other commodity 
than by producing them at home. 
For Ricardo and James Mill it was absolutely clear that the real cost comparison within a 
country as stipulated by the classical rule of specialization is the one and only relevant cost 
comparison for determining the interest of a country in a certain exchange, and for measuring 
the gains that accrue from it. Furthermore, both considered the real cost comparison between 
countries – which is the one emphasized by the comparative-advantage proposition – as 
irrelevant for the interest of a country in a particular exchange. Ricardo stated this in a footnote5, 
and James Mill further emphasized this crucial point in the Elements when he stated (1826, pp. 
123-124): 
“To produce exchange, therefore, there must be two countries, and two commodities.  
When both countries can produce both commodities, it is not greater absolute, but 
greater relative, facility, that induces one of them to confine itself to the production of one 
of the commodities, and to import the other.  
When a country can either import a commodity or produce it at home, it compares the 
cost of producing at home with the cost of procuring from abroad; if the latter cost is less 
than the first, it imports. The cost at which a country can import from abroad depends, not 
upon the cost at which the foreign country produces the commodity, but upon what the 
commodity costs which it sends in exchange, compared with the cost which it must be at to 
produce the commodity in question, if it did not import it. 
If a quarter of corn is produced in England with 50 days' labour, it may be equally her 
interest to import corn from Poland, whether it requires, in Poland, 50 days' labour, or 60, 
or 40, or any other number. Her only consideration is, whether the commodity with which 
she can import a quarter costs her less than 50 days' labour.” 
One may ask then: What is the logical relationship between the classical rule of specialization 
and the comparative-advantage proposition? Robbins (1958, p. 22) considers the classical rule of 
specialization to be ‘‘one-half of the principle of comparative cost.’’ This is an improper 
characterization of the relationship, though, since it might suggest that the classical rule of 
                                                
5 Ricardo stated in that footnote: “It can be of no consequence to America, whether the commodities she 
obtains in return for her own, cost Europeans much, or little labor; all she is interested in, is that they 
shall cost her less labor by purchasing them than by manufacturing them herself (Vol. II, p. 383). 
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specialization is somehow half-baked and incomplete with respect to the comparative-advantage 
proposition. The truth is that the comparative-advantage proposition is a logical implication of 
the classical rule of specialization, as Jacob Viner (1937, p. 441) correctly pointed out.6 James Mill 
makes this absolutely clear in the last paragraph of the long quote above. 
Every voluntary commercial relationship has to be built upon the mutual interest of the 
participants. This mutual interest is secured by applying the classical rule of specialization to all 
of the trading partners simultaneously but independently from each other, since each and every 
one of them has to be interested in the exchange. 
Compared to the ubiquity of the classical rule of specialization, the occasions in which the 
comparative-advantage proposition comes into play are far less common. This can be explained 
with the positive effects of the division of labor and specialization on the dexterity and 
productivity of individuals and countries, which makes it less common that one individual or 
country is more productive than another in the production of every commodity. Furthermore, 
the comparative-advantage proposition always requires the application of the classical rule of 
specialization for both countries, whereas the reverse is not necessary, as I have shown in a 
previous paper (Morales Meoqui, 2011, pp. 749-750). These reasons may explain why Ricardo 
referred to the comparative-advantage proposition only once and merely in passing in chapter 7 
of the Principles, whereas he applied the classical rule of specialization not only for measuring the 
gains from trade in the famous numerical example featuring English cloth and Portuguese wine, 
but also in other parts of the Principles as well.7 
Specifying the Achievement regarding Comparative Advantage 
Before dipping into the analysis of who should be credited for comparative advantage, lets 
make a brief recapitulation of the logical interrelationships between this proposition and two 
other important insights mentioned above. This is necessary for appreciating more accurately 
what should and what shouldn’t be considered as the central achievement regarding the 
comparative-advantage proposition. 
As already been stated, comparative advantage is the proposition that a country might import 
a certain amount of a commodity although it could produce it internally at lower real costs than 
the exporting country. Ricardo provided a full proof of comparative-advantage proposition in 
                                                
6 Viner calls the classical rule of specialization the eighteenth-century rule, while other authors refer to it as the 
gains-from-trade proposition. 
7 See, for example, Vol. I p. 295 and p. 319. 
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chapter seven of the Principles. He presented it there as a corollary of the non-appliance of the 
labor theory of value in international transactions. Without the later he could not haven proven 
the former. As a further proof of the original importance of the proposition regarding the non-
appliance of the labor theory of value in international transactions, John Stuart Mill dedicated a 
whole section of his Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy 
(1848) to explain it immediately before his correct statement of comparative advantage.8 
In addition of being a corollary, the comparative-advantage proposition is also a logical 
implication of the classical rule of specialization. This rule was already well known and repeatedly 
used in the economic literature before 1815, so neither Torrens nor Ricardo are entitled to any 
particular credit for it. They can only claim merit for demonstrating an important implication of 
this rule. 
Furthermore, since at the first sight comparative advantage appears to be a counterintuitive 
proposition, it is always a formidable challenge to convince the skeptics. Anything short of a 
complete and bulletproof demonstration of this proposition would certainly fail to convince 
them. Thus, the laurels for the comparative-advantage proposition should go to the economist 
who first came up with a full proof of it – not to the one who merely mentioned it as a possible 
implication of the classical rule of specialization. Even more so since the task of proving this 
implication is far from being a trivial exercise, as has been revealed by the repeated errors which 
James Mill committed when trying to reproduce Ricardo’s comparative-advantage proposition in 
the Elements (Mill, 1826, pp. 119-124). 
It is now established beyond doubt that Ricardo published a full proof of the comparative-
advantage proposition in the Principles. There is nothing missing or to be added there. For this 
reason, James and John Stuart Mill do not deserve any credit for the discovery of comparative 
advantage, and it is important to recognize once and for all that neither of them has ever claimed 
merit for this proposition. The only one who actually did was Torrens, although he made this 
claim only after Ricardo’s death and later recanted it.9 
                                                
8) See John Stuart Mill (1963-1991, Vol. III, pp. 587-617). 
9 De Vivo, the editor of the Collected Works of Robert Torrens (2000) points out that Torrens actually makes 
two different priority-claims: one regarding the advantages derived from trade in general based on The 
Economists Refuted, and another regarding comparative advantage in the preface of the 1826 edition of the 
External Corn Trade. De Vivo considers both claims far from convincing and hardly reconcilable with 
Torrens' own sweeping acknowledgments of Ricardo’s priority on the theory of foreign trade. See 
Torrens (Vol. II, pp. xvii-xix; Vol. VI, p. xxii). 
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Therefore, supporters of Torrens’ claim would have to bring up a satisfactory proof of this 
proposition prior to 1817, the year of publication of this book. There is indeed a paragraph in 
Torrens’ 1815 Essay on the External Corn Trade in which he mentions the possibility that England 
would import some amount of corn from Poland even if it had more fertile lands than the later. 
Many Torrens’ supporters as well as influential authors on history of economic thought like 
Samuel Hollander (1979, p. 461) have referred to this paragraph as the strongest evidence for the 
legitimacy of his claim of priority over comparative advantage. Furthermore, there can be no 
dispute about the fact that Torrens had already published his essay well before Ricardo arrived to 
the full proof of the comparative-advantage proposition, which Ruffin (2002, pp. 735-743) dates 
around the first two weeks of October 1816. But is this undisputed fact a sufficient reason for 
establishing the priority of Torrens over Ricardo as the legitimate author of the comparative-
advantage proposition? It might be, but only in case that Torrens’ statement contains a 
satisfactory proof of the comparative-advantage proposition, at least equal if not superior to 
Ricardo’s formulation in the Principles. So let’s analyze in greater detail the relevant paragraph in 
the next section. 
A Precise Account of Torrens’ Omissions 
As has been pointed out before, Torrens’ claim of authorship for the comparative-advantage 
proposition rests exclusively upon a single paragraph in the Essay on the External Corn Trade of 
1815. It contains the following statement: 
“If England should have acquired such a degree of skill in manufacturing, that, with any 
given portion of her capital, she could prepare a quantity of cloth, for which the Polish 
cultivator would give a greater quantity of corn, than she [England] could, with the same 
portion of capital, raise from her own soil, then, tracts of her territory, though they should 
be equal, nay, even though they should be superior, to the lands in Poland, will be neglected; 
and a part of her supply of corn will be imported from that country. For, though the capital 
employed in cultivating at home, might bring an excess of profit, over the capital employed 
in cultivating abroad, yet, under the supposition, the capital which should be employed in 
manufacturing, would obtain a still greater excess of profit; and this greater excess of profit 
would determine the direction of our industry” (Torrens, Vol. 2, pp. 264-265). 
He was well aware of the counterintuitive nature of this proposition, since he wrote at the 
beginning of the paragraph: 
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“Let us suppose, that there are, in England, unreclaimed districts, from which corn might 
be raised at as small an expenditure of labour and capital as from the fertile plains of Poland. 
[...] [It] seems natural to conclude, that if industry were left to take its most profitable 
direction, capital would be employed in raising corn at home, rather than in bringing it from 
Poland at an equal prime cost, and at a much greater expense of carriage. But this 
conclusion, however obvious and natural it may, at first sight, appear, might, on a closer 
examination, be found entirely erroneous” (Torrens, Vol. 2, pp. 263-264). 
Does the above paragraph contain a satisfactory proof of the comparative-advantage 
proposition? So far, the main omissions in Torrens’ statement already mentioned by other 
scholars are the following: (1) Torrens missed to make a full account of the costs of the factors 
of production in both countries; (2) consequently, he also failed to make the necessary cost 
comparisons; and (3) Torrens did not mention the key assumption of international immobility of 
the factors of production.10  
Generally speaking, these previous accounts of the flaws in Torrens’ 1815 statement are 
imprecise, as will be shown later on. Moreover, the logical connection between these flaws has 
been largely overseen. The incomplete nature of Torrens’ enunciation of the comparative-
advantage proposition can be explained in much greater detail and precision here thanks to a 
better understanding of the logical interrelationships between all the key elements in Ricardo’s 
original demonstration: the comparative-advantage proposition itself, the classical rule of 
specialization and the proposition regarding the non-appliance of the labor theory of value in 
international exchanges. This deeper understanding of his famous numerical example sheds a 
brighter light on the crucial flaws in Torrens’ statement. 
It is important to acknowledge right from the beginning that Torrens’ example is built on a 
different logical construction than Ricardo’s. Whereas Torrens compares the amounts of cloth 
and corn produced with a given quantity of capital and labor, Ricardo compares the amounts of 
laborers working for a year which are required to produce some unspecified quantity of cloth 
and wine traded. So each of them applies a different – although equally valid – version of the 
classical rule of specialization with its corresponding way of defining and calculating the gains 
from trade. In Ricardo’s numerical example the gains from trade consist in the respective 
amounts of labor saved in England and Portugal by the exchange; in Torrens’ example the gains 
from trade consist in the greater amount of corn that England is able to obtain with the same 
amount of resources by importing it from Poland rather than producing it at home. 
                                                
10 See Robbins (1958, p. 23) and Ruffin (2002, p. 733 and 2005, p. 717). 
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The acknowledgement of these distinctive logical constructions prevents us from incurring in 
the error of judging Torrens’ example through the spectacles of Ricardo’s four magic numbers. 
For the same reason, one should not evaluate Torrens’s statement by comparing it with the 
modern statement of comparative advantage. 
Ruffin (2002, p. 733) fails to notice the different logical constructions when he echoes 
Robbins’ claim (1958, p. 23) that Torrens missed to point out the cost ratios. If Torrens had 
used specific numbers in his example, though, they would have indicated some amount of 
output – not inputs or cost ratios. Therefore, the real issue missing in Torrens’s example is not 
the comparison of cost ratios but the application of the classical rule of specialization for Poland. 
For the featured international exchange of English cloth for Polish corn to actually take place, it 
has to be of mutual interest for both trading partners. Thus, Torrens should have applied the 
classical rule of specialization not only to England but to Poland as well. 
For further highlighting the incomplete nature of Torrens’ statement of comparative 
advantage, let us represent England’s exchange of a certain amount of cloth for a certain amount 
of Polish corn in a table. Torrens does not specify in the above paragraph the amounts of cloth 
and corn that can be produced in England and Poland with a given quantity of capital and labor, 
so I will use the parameters ClE, ClP, CoE and CoP to refer to these amounts. 
 
 
Amounts of goods that can be produced with a given 
quantity of capital and labor in the respective countries 
 cloth corn 
England ClE CoE 
Poland ClP CoP 
Table 1: Torrens’ Example 
Torrens affirms that CoP > CoE, i.e. the amount of corn that England imports from Poland in 
exchange for its cloth is higher than the amount of corn that England could have managed to 
produce internally using the same amount of capital and labor currently employed in the 
production of the cloth exported to Poland. He does not indicate, however, whether the costs of 
capital and labor for producing CoP and ClP in Poland are the same as for producing ClE and CoE 
in England.  
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One may think that such an explicit specification of Poland’s factor costs is not necessary, 
since the real costs of production for the amounts of English cloth and Polish corn traded have 
to be equal under the postulates of a real cost theory of value. But if the respective real costs of 
production in Poland and England were indeed the same, and Torrens indicates at the same time 
that CoP > CoE, then it would follow that Poland is more productive than England in the 
production of corn. This of course would contradict the whole point that Torrens is trying to 
make, i.e. that England would import corn from Poland despite being more productive in the 
production of this commodity. 
 If, on the contrary, the amounts of capital and labor embodied in the quantities of English 
cloth and Polish corn traded are not equal, then these commodities would have to have different 
exchange values under the postulates of a real cost theory of value. Since England is assumed to 
be more productive than Poland in the production of both cloth and corn, i.e. ClE > ClP and CoE 
> CoP, it follows then that the English commodities would have to be produced with less real 
factor costs. For the same reason, the English cloth must have less exchange value than the 
Polish corn, unless Torrens had explicitly stated and demonstrated that the law of value does not 
apply to international trade, which of course he didn’t. 
Nowadays it is rather difficult to assess whether Torrens was aware of the theoretical 
difficulties of offering a complete proof for the comparative-advantage proposition – a logical 
but counterintuitive implication of the classical rule of specialization. What seems clear now is 
that he simply bypassed these theoretical difficulties by skipping the application of the classical 
rule of specialization for Poland, and thus avoiding any explicit reference to the factor costs in 
that country. This explains why Torrens had nothing to say about the non-appliance of the law 
of value in international exchanges, which is a crucial proposition in Ricardo’s numerical 
example. As a consequence, he also failed to mention the critical assumption responsible for the 
non-appliance of the law of value in international trade: the inability of labor and capital to move 
from a country where productivity is low to another country with a higher level of productivity. 
For economists who adhere to the neoclassical theory of value, Torrens’ omissions may not 
seem as particularly important. According to the neoclassical theory of value, the real costs for 
the amounts of cloth and corn traded do not determine the relative value of these commodities, 
and therefore do not have to be necessarily equal. Therefore, a neoclassical economist could not 
be held accountable if his or her demonstration of the comparative-advantage proposition would 
have had similar deficiencies. The same kind of indulgence, however, cannot be applied to a 
classical political economist like Torrens. 
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For the sake of fairness one has to admit that most Torrens’ supporters would presumably 
share the assessment that his demonstration of the comparative-advantage proposition was 
indeed incomplete. Their argumentation in favor of granting him the authorship over Ricardo 
has always rested more on the alleged flaws in Ricardo’s demonstration of comparative 
advantage rather than the specific merits of Torrens’ exposition. For this reason, the accurate 
interpretation of Ricardo’s numerical example in the Principles is the equivalence of a knock-out 
punch against Torrens’ claim, since it proves the allegations against Ricardo wrong while further 
highlighting the incomplete nature of Torrens’ demonstration of the comparative-advantage 
proposition.  
In resume, Torrens may deserve some credit for realizing that the comparative-advantage 
proposition is indeed a possible implication of the classical rule of specialization. But since he 
did not offer a satisfactory proof of the proposition, he cannot be considered as its legitimate 
author nor granted precedence over Ricardo. It took the keener mind of a master logician like 
Ricardo’s to recognize the subtleties and theoretical challenges surrounding the proof of this 
counterintuitive proposition. As Ruffin (2002, p. 731) correctly states: “There is a difference between 
hinting at a result and providing the tools to prove a theorem.” And it has become clear now that it was 
Ricardo – not Torrens – who provided all the necessary tools for proving the comparative-
advantage proposition. 
Torrens and the Absolute Advantage Theory of Trade 
Finally, let’s analyze briefly the claim that Torrens was the author of the absolute advantage 
theory of trade (Ruffin, 2005). The approach of rejecting Torrens’ authorship-claim for the 
comparative-advantage proposition by affirming that he actually adhered to another theory is as 
old as the efforts to show that his 1815 statement was flawed and incomplete. In his well-known 
debate with Edwin Seligman (1911) a hundred years ago, Jacob Hollander (1911) used both 
approaches for rejecting Torrens’ claim. J. Hollander argued that with the exception of a single 
paragraph in Torrens’ Essay of 1815, the later adhered to the theory of “territorial division of 
labor”.11 Ruffin (2005) goes one step further by affirming that Torrens did not merely adhere but 
was actually the author and main supporter of the absolute advantage theory of trade. Ruffin’s 
explicit purpose of attributing this theory to Torrens is to disqualify him from claiming 
authorship for the comparative-advantage proposition. In essence, he argues that Torrens’ claim 
                                                
11 J. Hollander also stressed the fact that Torrens himself repeatedly recanted his authorship-claim in 1844. 
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over comparative advantage has to be rejected because of his alleged lack of consistency on the 
subject. 12 
Ruffin’s inconsistency-charge is based of course on the presumption that the absolute cost 
advantage theory of trade is the precursor and main alternative to the comparative-advantage 
proposition. This presumption, however, has been partially questioned in a previous paper 
(Morales Meoqui, 2010). There I have argued that the widespread notion of incompatibility 
between the comparative-advantage proposition and the absolute cost advantage theory of trade 
is actually dependent on a particular definition of the later. It is only valid for the case in which 
absolute cost advantage is defined in terms of a productivity advantage or real costs, for example 
less amount of labor time. If by absolute cost advantage, on the contrary, one merely means a 
nominal cost advantage, then it would not contradict the comparative-advantage proposition at 
all, since a foreign manufacturer always has to have a nominal cost (and price) advantage — or a 
real or perceived advantage in terms of product quality — over national manufacturers in order 
to export commodities to another country. Otherwise, why would anybody want to import 
commodities of similar quality from abroad if they were not cheaper? Therefore, there is no 
contraction between the comparative-advantage proposition and Ricardo’s following statement 
in the Principles: “The motive which determines us to import a commodity, is the discovery of its 
relative cheapness abroad: it is the comparison of its price abroad with its price at home (Vol. I, 
p. 170).” 
Moreover, Ruffin’s line of argumentation is unlikely to persuade those scholars who do not 
share his high appreciation for consistency. They will probably counter that consistency is not an 
indispensable requirement for deserving at least some credit for the formulation of a new 
concept, proposition or theory. In order to be considered as the main author of the comparative-
advantage proposition, it might be perfectly enough if Torrens had formulated an adequate 
demonstration of this proposition prior to the publication of the Principles.  
Taking into consideration the above objections, it seems very unlikely that Ruffin’s latest 
approach of rejecting Torrens’ claim of authorship over the comparative-advantage proposition 
by linking him to the absolute cost advantage theory of trade may resolve the longstanding 
debate in favor of Ricardo. Thus, the only feasible – and certainly the most promising – 
approach for rejecting Torrens’ claim continues to be the one which highlights as precisely as 
                                                
12 Ruffin (2005, pp. 711-712) states: “Although Torrens used a phrase that fit the law of comparative 
advantage, he surrounded the phrase with both nonsense (as will be shown) and the main alternative to 
that law. This would seem to be an unlikely basis for claiming that someone discovered the scientific 
theory or law. As has often been said, the hard part of discovering something important is recognizing it.” 
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possible the crucial shortcomings and omissions of his enunciation of the disputed proposition 
in the 1815 pamphlet, as I have tried to do in the present paper. 
Conclusions 
The comparative-advantage proposition is a logical implication of the classical rule of 
specialization. As such it is briefly mentioned – perhaps for the first time – in a pamphlet written 
by Torrens two years before the publication of Ricardo’s Principles. Although Torrens may 
deserve some credit for being the first to mention this possible implication of the classical rule of 
specialization, he cannot be considered as the legitimate author of the comparative-advantage 
proposition since he did not offer a satisfactory proof of it.  
Torrens clearly missed to apply the classical rule of specialization for Poland in his 1815 
example of English cloth being traded for Polish corn. For this featured international exchange 
to take place, though, there has to be gains from trade for both trading partners, not England 
alone. As a consequence of this omission, Torrens also failed to recognize the crucial role of the 
proposition about the non-appliance of the law of value in international exchanges in proving 
the comparative-advantage proposition, since the later is a corollary of the former. Because of 
these important flaws in Torrens’ statement, it is possible to reject his authorship-claim over the 
comparative-advantage proposition without having to take the rather tortuous and questionable 
approach of portraying him as the author and outspoken advocate of the absolute-advantage 
theory of trade. 
Ricardo was unquestionably the first economist who offered a full and yet ingeniously simple 
proof of the comparative-advantage proposition in the famous numerical example of chapter 
seven of the Principles. He was the one who convinced his fellow political economists of the 
rightfulness of this proposition. Consequently, I believe that he also deserves the bulk of the 
authorship-merit – if not the whole credit – for this proposition. 
It would be certainly idealistic and quite pretentious to believe that a single paper can put an 
end to one of the most enduring debates in the economic science. Scholars with considerable 
more experience, prestige and accomplishments than myself have failed to achieve this goal, so I 
don’t have the slightest illusion about that. I can only hope that my fellow researchers appreciate 
the merit of the two main contributions of this paper to the authorship-debate: (1) the emphasis 
on the logical interrelationships between all the key elements in Ricardo’s original demonstration 
of comparative advantage; and (2) a more accurate and precise account of the crucial omissions 
and shortcomings in Torrens’ 1815 statement. 
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